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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris1 has quickly become a 
staple in many Civil Procedure courses, and small wonder: everything sur-
rounding the case seems tailor-made for the classroom. The case involved a 
high-speed car chase, a scenario that many Americans have observed or experi-
enced first-hand. There is a dramatic dash cam video that the majority made 
available to the public via the Supreme Court website—a first—offering a cin-
ematic presentation of the major events of the dispute that culminates in a trag-
ic and explosive ending.2 And there is an experiment-based study published in 
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. My thanks to Steve Burbank, 
Jonah Gelbach, and Cathie Struve for their valuable substantive input on this article, to the 
Penn Law Fall 2014 Complex Litigation seminar for their careful attention to this work in 
draft, to Thom Main, the organizers of the festschrift symposium on behalf of Steve Subrin 
at Northeastern University School of Law, and the Nevada Law Journal for providing me the 
opportunity to develop these ideas, and of course to Steve Subrin himself, in whose honor 
this volume is published, for his friendship, his ethical example, and his service to the acad-
emy through the scholarly pursuit of knowledge over the decades. 
1  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
2  The Court included a link to the video footage in its opinion, see id. at  
378 n.5, but it appears no longer to be active. Through a different link, the Court  
maintains a copy of the full video. See Video Resources, SUPREME CT. U.S., 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/media/media.aspx (last visited May 6, 2015). Several copies 
1352 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1351 
the Harvard Law Review by experts on criminal law, psychology, and cultural 
cognition that calls into doubt the reliance that the Scott majority placed on the 
video’s ability to “speak for itself” in answering the questions about risk, dan-
ger to the public, and alternatives to deadly force that lay at the heart of their 
Fourth Amendment ruling.3 Scott v. Harris was an instant classic. 
As is often true with instant classics, however, splashy first impressions 
can mask a more complex state of affairs. At the heart of Scott v. Harris lies the 
potential for a radical doctrinal reformation: a shift in the core summary judg-
ment standard, undertaken to justify a massive expansion of interlocutory ap-
pellate jurisdiction in qualified immunity cases. 
Scott was an interlocutory appeal from a denial of the officer’s defensive 
motion for summary judgment. The content of the factual record in the case 
was actively contested, and the rulings of the lower federal courts rested in sig-
nificant part on their conclusion that a genuine dispute existed as to the material 
facts that the record could support. When the Court took the case and rendered 
a decision on the merits, it was acting in apparent contravention of its own ear-
lier holding that disputes over “evidence insufficiency” are categorically inap-
propriate for interlocutory review under the collateral order doctrine in quali-
fied immunity cases.4 The respondent’s merits brief raised the question of 
appellate jurisdiction,5 but the Court offered only a perfunctory acknowledg-
ment of the issue,6 as had the Eleventh Circuit before it.7 In hearing the appeal 
and reversing despite this apparent barrier to immediate review, the Court ef-
fectuated a silent revolution in interlocutory jurisdiction, reframing substantive 
elements of the summary judgment and qualified immunity doctrines to ac-
complish that end. 
That reframing begins with the “genuine dispute of material fact” standard 
in summary judgment practice and its requirement that courts view a discovery 
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party by drawing every 
reasonable inference in that party’s favor. As Part I of this article explains, one 
key passage in Scott, if taken seriously, appears to erase the presumption in fa-
vor of non-moving parties altogether, while other portions of the opinion push 
toward a requirement that the plaintiff identify a single “version of the facts” in 
opposing a summary judgment motion, rather than being able to rely upon the 
more expansive range of possibilities that the “every reasonable inference” 
                                                                                                                                
of the video footage are available on YouTube. See Scott v. Harris (USSC 05-1631) Pursuit 
Video, YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrVKSgRZ2GY [here-
inafter Scott v. Harris Pursuit Video] (containing an edited, higher-quality version of the 
video with key portions of the chase). 
3  Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils 
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009). 
4  Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 308, 313 (1995). 
5  Brief for Respondent at 1, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05-1631), 2007 WL 118977, at *1. 
6  Scott, 550 U.S. at 376 n.2. 
7  Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 807, 811 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott v. 
Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
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standard ought to vouchsafe. In both respects, the Court weakens the presump-
tion in favor of the non-moving party in summary judgment. Subsequent state-
ments by the Court make clear that Scott has not worked an instantaneous revo-
lution. However, developments in the lower federal courts reveal that the 
uncertainty introduced by the opinion is already eroding this core feature of the 
summary judgment standard. 
The Court introduces this doctrinal instability for a specific purpose: to jus-
tify sub silentio its expansion of appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order 
doctrine. The relationship between these doctrines is the subject of Part II. The 
Court’s prior treatment of the collateral order doctrine had appeared to prohibit 
immediate appeal in qualified immunity cases where the dispute centered on 
the presence or absence of a genuine dispute of fact in the record. In order to 
escape that strict limitation, the Scott majority assigned the trial court’s denial 
of summary judgment to a new category—rulings that “blatantly contradict” 
the record and therefore do not count as “genuine” factual disputes at all—
thereby circumventing its earlier holdings and justifying resort to the collateral 
order doctrine. The undermining of the “every reasonable inference” standard 
described in Part I was instrumental to this expansion of appellate jurisdiction. 
The final element of Scott’s realignment of the doctrinal landscape in-
volves the qualified immunity doctrine itself and the administration of that doc-
trine in summary judgment practice—the subject of Part III. As has been much 
noted, the line between questions of “fact” and questions of “law” is often con-
tested and hard to define.8 Qualified immunity blurs that line yet further, par-
ticularly in cases involving Fourth Amendment claims. In order to decide 
whether a principle of law was “clearly established” at the time that disputed 
events took place in such a case, a judge must determine the relationship be-
tween a contested factual record in the present lawsuit and the conclusions that 
a reasonable government official could draw from the fact patterns of prior rul-
ings—an exercise that cannot properly be described as belonging to a strictly 
defined category of “fact” or “law.” The Scott majority nonetheless character-
izes Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis as presenting a “pure” ques-
tion of law, a move that reinforces the Court’s expansion of appellate jurisdic-
tion while at the same time encouraging lower federal courts to be more 
aggressive in using summary judgment to dismiss Fourth Amendment claims. 
                                                        
8  See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982) (noting “the vexing nature 
of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law” and acknowledging the 
absence of any “rule or principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a le-
gal conclusion”); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670–71 (1944) (“The phrase 
‘finding of fact’ may be a summary characterization of complicated factors of varying signif-
icance for judgment. Such a ‘finding of fact’ may be the ultimate judgment on a mass of de-
tails involving not merely an assessment of the trustworthiness of witnesses but other appro-
priate inferences that may be drawn from living testimony which elude print. The 
conclusiveness of a ‘finding of fact’ depends on the nature of the materials on which the 
finding is based.”). 
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Scott is about much more than perceptions of video evidence. The case 
marks an inflection point in summary judgment practice for all qualified im-
munity cases, a new direction in the collateral order doctrine, and a potential 
change of course in the core summary judgment standard that could erode the 
pathway to trial for plaintiffs in every type of dispute. 
I. SCOTT V. HARRIS AND EVERY REASONABLE INFERENCE 
A. The Origins of the Standard 
The received account of the summary judgment standard holds that a court 
must consider the factual record in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, drawing every reasonable inference in that party’s favor, when deciding 
whether to grant the motion and pretermit a jury trial. The proposition first ap-
pears in these terms among the Supreme Court’s cases in a pair of antitrust rul-
ings from 1962 in which the Court reversed orders granting summary judgment 
motions to the defendants. In the first, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, the Court explained that its reversal of the lower court’s order proceeded 
from its examination of “the record on summary judgment in the light most fa-
vorable to . . . the party opposing the motion.”9 In the second, United States v. 
Diebold—a short per curiam opinion that is cited far more frequently for the 
point than Poller—the Court explained that the rulings of the district court in 
that case “represent[ed] a choice of inferences to be drawn from the subsidiary 
facts contained in the affidavits, attached exhibits, and depositions submitted 
below” and that “[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the 
underlying facts contained in such materials must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Because “inferences contrary to 
those drawn by the trial court might [have been] permissible” on the record be-
fore it, the Court reversed the order granting summary judgment.10 In neither 
case did the Court offer any citation for this formulation of the standard, treat-
ing it as well established. 
The proposition that non-moving parties are entitled to have every reason-
able inference drawn in their favor traces its lineage to the practice of request-
ing a directed verdict at trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict follow-
ing the return of a jury decision. When reviewing such orders, the Court had 
long observed that the prerogatives of the jury require the scale to be weighted 
in favor of the non-moving party. In Lumbra v. United States, for example, the 
Court heard an appeal in a disability insurance case where the United States 
sought judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict awarded in favor of a former 
                                                        
9  Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). The Court also had this to 
say about the use of summary procedures in an antitrust dispute: “We believe that summary 
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent 
play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile 
witnesses thicken the plot.” Id. 
10  United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam). 
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army private pursuing a disability claim. The case posed the question “whether 
there was any evidence upon which a verdict for petitioner might properly be 
found,” and the posture of the case required the Court to “assume as established 
all the facts that the evidence supporting petitioner’s claims reasonably tends to 
prove, and that there should be drawn in his favor all the inferences fairly de-
ducible from such facts.”11 
In its first opinion interpreting Rule 56 following the implementation of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court drew a connection to directed ver-
dict practice in defining the standard for granting a summary judgment motion, 
albeit without making explicit reference to favorable inferences for the non-
moving party. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas involved a dispute over the rate 
at which a landowner should be compensated for certain natural gas extrac-
tions. The case was complicated by the fact that the dispute involved the proper 
measure of damages, and the original language of Rule 56 left some doubt 
about whether disputes over damages could be resolved through summary 
judgment (an ambiguity that was resolved in a subsequent amendment to the 
Rule).12 Noting this problem, the Court said of the dispute before it: 
Where the undisputed facts leave the existence of a cause of action depending on 
questions of damage which the rule has reserved from the summary judgment 
process, it is doubtful whether summary judgment is warranted on any showing. 
But at least a summary disposition of issues of damage should be on evidence 
which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and which would require a di-
rected verdict for the moving party.13 
Only “where it is quite clear what the truth is” would summary judgment 
be appropriate under this standard.14 
The explicit proposition that the court should draw all inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party when considering a motion for summary judgment en-
tered the doctrine more gradually. In the notes on Rule 56 contained in the first 
                                                        
11  Lumbra v. United States, 290 U.S. 551, 553 (1934). The Court went on to affirm the Sec-
ond Circuit’s reversal of the district court and granted the motion despite its deference to the 
jury. See id. at 560–61. See also, e.g., Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930) (“[I]n de-
termining a motion of either party for a peremptory instruction, the court assumes that the 
evidence for the opposing party proves all that it reasonably may be found sufficient to es-
tablish, and that from such facts there should be drawn in favor of the latter all the inferences 
that fairly are deducible from them.”). 
12  Rule 56 originally read, in pertinent part, “The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
56 (1938), quoted in Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 623 (1944). The high-
lighted language could either be read to mean that summary judgment on a liability issue 
was appropriate even if a genuine dispute remained as to damages, or that summary judg-
ment was only available as to liability matters and never as to damages. The Rule was 
amended in 1946 to resolve this ambiguity. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note 
(1946 amendment). 
13  Sartor, 321 U.S. at 623–24. 
14  Id. at 627. 
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edition of Moore’s Federal Practice, published in 1938 to coincide with the ef-
fective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the concept does not ap-
pear, but Moore does introduce the idea that the supporting papers of the mo-
vant and the non-movant should be judged by different standards. The State of 
New York added a provision for summary judgment to its civil code in 1921, 
Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice (the scope of which it expanded in 
1933), and Professor Moore treats that provision and associated case law as one 
of the most important antecedents in describing the operation of Federal Rule 
56.15 One issue of concern under Rule 113 involved the possibility of a vari-
ance between a claim or defense as detailed in a pleading and the evidence 
brought forward at summary judgment. Where such a variance arose, the 
court’s response would depend upon whether the party in question was advanc-
ing or opposing the motion. “The courts are critical of the papers presented by 
the moving party,” the treatise explains, whereas “Courts are not as critical of 
the opposing papers as they are of the moving papers.”16 
Early federal court decisions interpreting Rule 56 expanded upon this idea 
that the moving and non-moving parties were differently situated. In Weisser v. 
                                                        
15  See Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 
444–51 (1929) (describing New York’s adoption of the procedure in 1921); see also JAMES 
WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, 3 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3176–78 (1st ed. 1938) (noting the 1933 expansion of 
summary judgment in New York and discussing their value as antecedents to Rule 56). Pro-
fessor Moore’s exclusive focus on summary judgment in New York as an antecedent to Fed-
eral Rule 56 was misplaced, and perhaps somewhat parochial. Professor Edson Sunderland 
of the University of Michigan Law School, who was “the chief architect of the rules on dis-
covery, pre-trial conference, and summary judgment,” worked from a broader base of doc-
trinal knowledge in crafting the provision. Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1476 (1987); see id. at 1476 n.74 (collecting published and unpublished 
materials recording Sunderland’s influence in the crafting of the discovery rules); Stephen N. 
Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in His-
torical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 967 (1987) (discussing Sunderland’s role in 
crafting the discovery rules); see also Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MICH. L. REV. 6, 10 (1959) (“[T]he several rules for discovery 
and summary judgment [were] and now remain[] a tribute to Edson’s genius.”). Professor 
Sunderland conducted comprehensive investigations into state court discovery practices in 
the years preceding the adoption of the Federal Rules, and while New York was an important 
player in his work, other states—including Michigan—also loomed large. Thus, in his article 
discussing the evolution of discovery in England and surveying contemporary practices 
among American states, Sunderland explored the relationship between restrictive discovery 
rules and the role of summary judgment, and he used summary judgment figures from state 
courts in both New York and Michigan by way of illustration. Edson R. Sunderland, Scope 
and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 872–73 (1933). And indeed, the 
standards for summary judgment that emerged in the state courts of Michigan in the 1930s 
prefigured the federal standard that would soon follow. See, e.g., People’s Wayne Cnty. 
Bank v. Wolverine Box Co., 230 N.W. 170, 172 (Mich. 1930) (describing summary judg-
ment in Michigan as “a speedy method of determining whether there are any issues of fact in 
causes arising upon contract, judgment, or statute” and drawing the same connection be-
tween the standards for summary judgment and for directed verdict that would later be relied 
upon by the Supreme Court of the United States in Sartor). 
16  MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 3189–90. 
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Mursam Shoe Corp., before a panel that included Judge Charles E. Clark, an-
other principal drafter of the Rules, the Second Circuit reversed a district 
court’s order granting summary judgment in a contract dispute and explained: 
“since this case comes up on motion for summary judgment, we must give the 
plaintiffs the benefit of every doubt.”17 That proposition quickly spread.18 At 
the same time, lower federal courts were drawing the connection between 
summary judgment and directed verdict or JNOV practice, emphasizing the 
necessary relationship between the two. In one of the earliest statements to this 
effect under the Federal Rules, a district court in South Dakota granted a plain-
tiff’s motion for summary judgment, explaining: 
The record before me shows conclusively that the payment in question constitut-
ed a preferential payment under the Bankruptcy Act, and if no motion for sum-
mary judgment had been made and the case were tried in the regular manner, a 
motion for a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff would of necessity be 
granted.19 
This idea was also taken up widely, and another pair of decisions from the Sec-
ond Circuit, one written by Judge Clark and the other by Judge Learned 
Hand,20 strongly endorsed the linkage between the summary judgment and di-
rected verdict standards a year before the Court’s more equivocal statement to 
the same effect in Sartor.21 
The Eighth Circuit appears to have been the first federal appeals court to 
draw all these doctrinal strands together by importing the particular language of 
“all reasonable inferences” from directed verdict practice into the summary 
judgment standard. Writing a year before the Court’s decision in Sartor in a 
case called Ramsouer v. Midland Valley Railroad Company, the court of ap-
peals reversed the order of a district court that had granted summary judgment 
for the defendant on a wrongful death claim. 
We have not reviewed all the evidence bearing upon the particular features 
stressed by the respective parties, and there is more or less conflict in the testi-
mony, but the issue to be tried on a motion for summary judgment is whether or 
not there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and not how that issue should 
                                                        
17  Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 346 (2d Cir. 1942) (footnote omitted). 
18  See, e.g., Toebelman v. Mo.-Kan. Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1018 (3d Cir. 1942) (cit-
ing Weisser, 127 F.2d 344). 
19  Culhane v. Jackson Hardware Co., 25 F. Supp. 324, 324 (D.S.D. 1938) (citation omitted). 
20  See Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1943) (“ ‘To say that a 
false denial, which defendants are unable to justify, must nevertheless put the plaintiff to his 
common-law proof before a jury, although the result would be a directed verdict in plain-
tiff’s favor as a matter of law, is to exalt the shadow above the substance.’ ” (quoting Hanna 
v. Mitchell, 196 N.Y.S. 43, 55 (App. Div. 1922))); Radio City Music Hall Corp. v. United 
States, 135 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1943) (“When a party presents evidence on which, taken 
by itself, it would be entitled to a directed verdict if believed, and which the opposite party 
does not discredit as dishonest, it rests upon that party at least to specify some opposing evi-
dence which it can adduce and which will change the result. In this case the defendant 
should have specified . . . .”). 
21  See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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be determined. In considering such a motion as in a motion for a directed ver-
dict, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the party 
against whom it is directed, giving to that party the benefit of all favorable infer-
ences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. If, when so viewed, rea-
sonable men might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied and 
the case tried on its merits.22 
By the second edition of Moore’s Federal Practice, this proposition had 
been widely accepted, and it was incorporated into the treatise’s account of the 
summary judgment standard23 and then recited by the Court as the received un-
derstanding some years later in Poller and Diebold. 
B. Scott v. Harris and the Summary Judgment Standard 
Scott v. Harris has called into question the stability of this core feature of 
the summary judgment standard. Scott is best known for the Court’s treatment 
of the video evidence in the discovery record—the dash cam recording of the 
high-speed chase that removed all doubt from the minds of the majority that the 
use of deadly force to stop Victor Harris was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. The provocative study by Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman exposing 
the cultural and social contingency of perceptions of that video has become a 
staple in discussions about the case.24 But another passage of Scott with great 
potential doctrinal significance has gone unexamined by academics. If applied 
literally, this passage appears to subvert a central feature of summary judgment 
doctrine, and it is already causing mischief in the lower federal courts. 
Scott came to the Court as an appeal from a denial of summary judgment 
on a qualified immunity defense. Rejecting the view of the lower federal courts 
in the case, the majority found that reasonable minds could not differ about the 
level of dangerousness that Victor Harris posed as he fled the Georgia police, 
and hence the propriety of the officers’ use of deadly force under the Fourth 
Amendment.25 In order to reach that result, the majority had to overcome the 
deference ordinarily due to the non-moving party, and it vaulted this hurdle 
through reliance upon the video, which it believed “quite clearly contradict[ed] 
the version of the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Ap-
peals.”26 The majority concluded that the lower courts “should have viewed the 
                                                        
22  Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R.R. Co., 135 F.2d 101, 105–06 (8th Cir. 1943). 
23  The second edition describes the standard of deference thusly: 
Since it is not the function of the trial court to adjudicate genuine factual issues at the hear-
ing on the motion for summary judgment, in ruling on the motion all inferences of fact from the 
proofs proffered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party op-
posing the motion. 
6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56.15(3) (2d ed. 1948), quoted 
in Patty v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 101 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). 
24  See generally Kahan et al., supra note 3 (finding “sharp differences of opinion” between 
1350 participants after viewing the Scott v. Harris high-speed chase video). 
25  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376, 380 (2007). 
26  Id. at 378. 
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facts in the light depicted by the videotape”27 and committed reversible error 
when they failed to do so. 
In the process of justifying its conclusion, the majority offered a reformula-
tion of the summary judgment standard that a moment’s reflection reveals to be 
shocking. “At the summary judgment stage,” the opinion explains, “facts must 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.”28 Rehearsing familiar language from 
Matsushita and Anderson describing when a “genuine” dispute of fact might 
exist, the Court concluded that Victor Harris’s version of events was “blatantly 
contradicted by the record” and hence not entitled to the benefit of any favora-
ble light.29 
This formulation—“that facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts”—
would swallow the entire standard if taken seriously and applied as written. The 
entire question in a summary judgment motion is whether there is a “genuine” 
dispute of material fact.30 The non-movant is entitled to every reasonable infer-
ence when determining whether a genuine dispute exists—he enjoys the benefit 
of that deference when determining whether the standard is satisfied. Saying 
that “facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts” is the equivalent of saying 
that the non-moving party is entitled to this deference only if he can first show 
that he will prevail on the motion. A genuine dispute of fact is the very thing 
concerning which the non-moving party is entitled to have every reasonable in-
ference drawn in his favor. If the non-movant were required to demonstrate a 
genuine dispute of fact before enjoying the benefit of that deference, then the 
non-movant would enjoy no deference at all—as, indeed, appears to have hap-
pened in Scott. 
Scott was not written as an express statement of revolution in summary 
judgment practice and, as the materials below explain, the Court still appears to 
believe that the accepted formulation of the standard retains its vitality. At the 
same time, it is clear that Scott is not a mere aberration. It is necessary to un-
pack this language, which has been repeated by the Court itself in a subsequent 
decision31 and has already begun to distort summary judgment doctrine among 
the lower federal courts. 
                                                        
27  Id. 380–81. The Court uses the term “videotape” throughout its opinion, but it seems like-
ly that the dashboard-mounted camera recorded digitally, not on a tape. 
28  Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
29  Id. (discussing Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)). 
30  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”). 
31  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 
380 (2007)). 
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The Court conflates two concepts when it rules against Victor Harris: 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and adopt-
ing the plaintiff’s version of the facts. Indeed, the opinion makes this conflation 
explicit. After explaining that ordinarily “courts are required to view the facts 
and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party oppos-
ing’ ” summary judgment, the Court follows by observing that “[i]n qualified 
immunity cases, this usually means adopting (as the Court of Appeals did here) 
the plaintiff’s version of the facts.”32 The Court then goes on to conduct its 
analysis concerning the presumption in favor of the non-moving party as a con-
test between two competing stories: the plaintiff’s “version of the facts” and the 
events it believes are depicted in the video.33 
As a descriptive matter, it may be true that lower courts often adopt “the 
plaintiff’s version of the facts”—the single narrative urged by a plaintiff in re-
sponse to a summary judgment motion—when ruling on defensive requests for 
summary judgment in qualified immunity cases. As an analytical matter, how-
ever, the concepts are distinct. A court can conclude that the version of the facts 
urged most strongly by the plaintiff is not supported by competent evidence in 
the discovery record—assuming that the plaintiff indeed urges a single version 
of the facts in responding to a defensive motion—but nonetheless conclude that 
a jury could still draw reasonable inferences that would lead to a finding of lia-
bility. Indeed, the text of Rule 56 specifies that a court is empowered to con-
duct an independent review of the discovery record when making such a judg-
ment.34 Not every case will require an examination of record materials that 
were not cited in the briefs (as the text also makes clear), but Rule 56 expressly 
empowers a judge to consider the full range of reasonable inferences that a jury 
could draw from the record, and a proper application of the summary judgment 
standard sometimes requires a district court to do so. 
Consider the facts of Scott v. Harris itself. The “plaintiff’s version of the 
facts” that was accepted by the lower federal courts in conjunction with the 
summary judgment motion is summarized in the decision of the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. 
[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, [respondent] remained in 
control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his 
indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road. Nor was he a 
                                                        
32  Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962); 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). 
33  Id. at 378–80. 
34  Rule 56(c)(3), entitled “Materials Not Cited,” provides: “The court need consider only the 
cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3). 
This provision was added in the 2010 amendments to Rule 56. The advisory committee note 
reads, “Subdivision (c)(3) reflects judicial opinions and local rules provisions stating that the 
court may decide a motion for summary judgment without undertaking an independent 
search of the record. Nonetheless, the rule also recognizes that a court may consider record 
materials not called to its attention by the parties.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s 
note (2010 amendment). 
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threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pe-
destrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time 
the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the mo-
torway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police 
blockades of the nearby intersections.35 
The “plaintiff’s version of events” here consists of a catalog of the specific 
details of the chase. The Court takes issue with this account, describing instead 
a different set of details that it finds “closely resembles a Hollywood-style car 
chase of the most frightening sort.”36In rejecting the plaintiff’s “version of 
events,” the majority concludes that the lower federal courts improperly nar-
rowed the focus of their analysis to the details that Harris emphasized without 
also considering other events that were revealed on the videotape, where one 
sees Harris’s car “swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the dou-
ble-yellow line, . . . force cars traveling in both directions to their respective 
shoulders to avoid being hit[,] . . . run multiple red lights[,] and travel for con-
siderable periods of time in the occasional center left-turn-only lane.”37 Insofar 
as the “plaintiff’s version of events” sought to eliminate those details from all 
consideration, the Court concludes, that version of events must be rejected. 
Perhaps that is correct. But even placing the details emphasized by the 
Court back into the mix, significant factual questions remain. How much space 
was there on either side of the highway, and were pedestrians ever in any dan-
ger? When Victor Harris “force[d] cars traveling in both directions to their re-
spective shoulders,” was he menacing those cars off the road, or did they pull 
off preemptively when they saw the flashing lights of the police? When Harris 
ran red lights, were there cars approaching from incoming streets, or did he 
have a clear field of vision at those intersections? And what of Officer Scott’s 
role in the decision to use deadly force to stop Victor Harris? Were his motiva-
tions clear? Officer Scott testified that Harris ran into his car during the portion 
of the chase in which police almost trapped Harris in a parking lot, a fact that 
the majority treated as uncontested and emphasized in making the case that 
Harris posed a danger.38 But Harris testified in his deposition that it was Scott 
who caused the contact between the cars, not the other way around, and the 
video sheds no light on the question.39 Moments after Harris exited the parking 
lot, Officer Scott asked to take the lead in the chase so that he could be the one 
to execute the deadly maneuver. He can be heard on the video saying, “Alright, 
                                                        
35  Scott, 550 U.S. at 379 (alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 
807, 815–16 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
36  Id. at 380. 
37  Id. at 379 (footnote omitted). 
38  Id. at 375 (“Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott’s 
police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway.”). 
39  See Harris v. Coweta Cnty., No. CIVA 3:01CV148 WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *1 & 
n.2 (describing Harris’s account of the contact that occurred between his car and Officer 
Scott’s car in the parking lot), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), 
rev’d sub nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
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let me have him, [car] 78, my car’s already tore up”40—a reference to the minor 
damage to his patrol car from the encounter in the parking lot. Could a rational 
jury have found that Officer Scott was acting from a desire for revenge, or out 
of anger, or from some other unprofessional motive when he jumped ahead to 
ram Harris’s car, calling into question the reasonableness of his actions? 
These and many other details of the chase are subject to debate even after a 
viewing of the video. In some cases, the answers are not clearly depicted, re-
quiring inference and interpretation. As to those matters, the proposition that 
the non-moving party is entitled to every reasonable inference should still be 
fully operative, even if “the plaintiff’s version of events”—the particular set of 
facts that Victor Harris emphasized—does not control. 
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the presumption in favor of the non-
moving party is suspended altogether as soon as the “plaintiff’s version of 
events” has been rejected. Here are the first and last sentences of that key para-
graph: 
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most fa-
vorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those 
facts. . . . When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is bla-
tantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a 
court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a mo-
tion for summary judgment.41 
Rejecting the plaintiff’s version of the facts, in this formulation, is equivalent to 
suspending the presumption in favor of the non-moving party altogether. 
This analytical maneuver in Scott recalls a similar gesture in a passage of 
the majority opinion in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the ruling from that same 
Term in which the Court upended pleading standards under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(a).42 Twombly turned on the plausibility of the plaintiff’s al-
legation that parallel anticompetitive behavior by regional telecommunications 
companies was the result of a conspiracy rather than the innocent actions of 
corporate executives who came to similar but independent conclusions about 
their best course of action. The plaintiffs had included detailed allegations of 
the defendants’ parallel conduct in their complaint, and while the complaint al-
so contained stand-alone allegations of a conspiracy, it tied the allegation of 
conspiracy directly to the allegations of parallel conduct in one passage.43 The 
                                                        
40  In the composite version of the video, Scott v. Harris Pursuit Video, supra note 2, this 
exchange begins at time index 4:19. 
41  Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. 
42  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
43  See Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 19, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 
313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 Civ. 10220), 2003 WL 25629874 (“In the ab-
sence of any meaningful competition between the [Regional Bell Operating Companies] in 
one another’s markets, and in light of the parallel course of conduct that each engaged in to 
prevent competition from [Competitive Local Exchange Carriers] within their respective . . . 
markets . . . Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that Defendants have entered into a 
contract, combination or conspiracy . . . .”). 
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sufficiency of parallel conduct as evidence of a conspiracy is one of the main 
areas of focus throughout the opinion, with the majority characterizing its rul-
ing on the pleadings question as an “antecedent” to its earlier rulings on evi-
dence of parallel conduct at later phases of the litigation process.44 After identi-
fying the decision of the plaintiffs to “rest their [antitrust] claim on descriptions 
of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement” 
as the principal infirmity of the complaint,45 the Court drops a footnote and 
says: “If the complaint had not explained that the claim of agreement rested on 
the parallel conduct described, we doubt that the complaint’s reference to an 
agreement among the [Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers] would have given 
the notice required by Rule 8.”46 
Notice the attitude toward potential competing explanations that this pas-
sage reveals. The Court does not say, “Had the complaint contained only a bare 
allegation of conspiracy and not even included the allegations of parallel con-
duct as context, then a fortiori it would have failed to satisfy Rule 8.” To the 
contrary, the Court indicates that excluding the allegations of parallel conduct 
would have eliminated a flaw in the complaint and strengthened the plaintiff’s 
position, leading the Court to say that they still “doubt” that the complaint 
would have passed muster even under those more favorable circumstances. In 
the Court’s view, the allegations of parallel conduct made the plaintiffs’ anti-
trust complaint weaker than if it had only contained the stand-alone allegation 
of conspiracy. 
How can this be so? Even Twombly’s revisionist account of Conley v. Gib-
son47 reaffirms that “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be sup-
ported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the com-
plaint.”48 If the plaintiffs can prove a set of facts consistent with an allegation 
of conspiracy, what difference does it make if they also include allegations of 
parallel conduct in their complaint that wind up being extraneous to their 
claim? The allegations of parallel conduct in the Twombly complaint were the 
pleading equivalent of the “plaintiff’s version of the facts” that the majority in 
Scott seized upon when describing how qualified immunity claims should 
“usually” be administered at summary judgment49—a treatment of a dispositive 
motion standard that improperly constrains the plaintiff’s access to relief. 
At the pleadings stage, plaintiffs must sometimes engage in educated spec-
ulation about the details of a defendant’s behavior. So long as the complaint is 
sufficient on its face, the Conley standard has always protected the plaintiff’s 
                                                        
44  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–55. 
45  Id. at 564. 
46  Id. at 565 n.10. 
47  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
48  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (“Conley, then, described the breadth of opportunity to prove 
what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to gov-
ern a complaint’s survival.”). 
49  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). 
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ability to get some of those details wrong at the outset—and, if necessary, to 
amend the complaint following development of the facts in order to bring it in-
to conformity with the proof that actually emerges. In contrast, Twombly essen-
tially held that the plaintiffs had pled themselves out of court by reinforcing 
their stand-alone allegations of conspiracy with details that the majority be-
lieved to be unhelpful to them—a proposition that the Court made explicit 
when it wrote in a succeeding footnote that “[t]he dissent's quotations from the 
complaint leave the impression that plaintiffs directly allege illegal agreement; 
in fact, they proceed exclusively via allegations of parallel conduct.”50 This re-
formulation of the Conley standard introduces a new trap for unwary plaintiffs 
at the pleadings stage and is unfaithful to Rule 8’s direction that pleadings be 
construed “so as to do justice.”51 
Just so, at the close of discovery, a claimant sometimes confronts a record 
that contains multiple possibilities and admits of multiple distinct inferences 
that could support a claim for relief. If she proceeds to trial, the claimant will 
have to make strategic choices about which theory of the case to present to a 
jury. At summary judgment, however, the claimant is entitled to every reasona-
ble inference that the discovery record can support, and that includes the possi-
bility of multiple versions of events, any one of which would present a triable 
case. When Scott v. Harris pushes the plaintiff to adopt one “version of events” 
at summary judgment and then ties its rejection of the deference normally owed 
to the non-moving party to a finding that this one version of events is “blatantly 
contradicted” by the record, it deprives the non-moving party of the full meas-
ure of the deference it is due under Rule 56. 
Academic commentators appear not to have recognized the significance of 
this language in Scott,52 but lower federal courts have begun to grapple with it. 
                                                        
50  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 n.11. The Court’s statement here is inaccurate, or at least mis-
leading. As detailed above, the complaint also includes stand-alone allegations of conspira-
cy—the majority simply discounts those as “conclusory” in nature. See id. at 556–557. The 
majority is responding here to the opening passages of Justice Stevens’s dissent, where he 
frames a critique that evinces a similar instinct. 
In the first paragraph of its 23-page opinion the Court states that the question to be decided 
is whether allegations that “major telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel con-
duct unfavorable to competition” suffice to state a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The an-
swer to that question has been settled for more than 50 years. If that were indeed the issue, a 
summary reversal . . . would adequately resolve this case. As [we have] held, parallel conduct is 
circumstantial evidence admissible on the issue of conspiracy, but it is not itself illegal. 
Thus, this is a case in which there is no dispute about the substantive law. If the defendants 
acted independently, their conduct was perfectly lawful. If, however, that conduct is the product 
of a horizontal agreement among potential competitors, it was unlawful. The plaintiffs have al-
leged such an agreement and, because the complaint was dismissed in advance of answer, the al-
legation has not even been denied. Why, then, does the case not proceed? 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570–71 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
51  FED. R. CIV. PROC. 8(e). 
52  I am aware of only one commentary on Scott v. Harris that mentions this language. It is a 
student comment, and the reference to the passage occurs only in passing and appears to 
miss its significance. See Forrest Plesko, Comment, (Im)Balance and (Un)Reasonableness: 
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Some lower federal courts, taking direction from Scott, have introduced a new 
component to their summary judgment analysis: a “blatantly contradicts” test 
that operates prior to, rather than as an interpretation of, the deferential pre-
sumption that the non-moving party is supposed to receive. In Obester v. Lucas 
Associates, for example, a district court in Georgia described the standard to be 
applied at summary judgment in the following terms: 
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly con-
tradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should 
not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for sum-
mary judgment.” If the record does not blatantly contradict the nonmovant’s 
version of events, the court must determine “whether a fair-minded jury could 
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”53 
If the court concludes that the record “blatantly contradicts” the plaintiff’s sto-
ry, on this formulation, then the analysis is over: there is no further deferential 
analysis of the discovery record to determine whether there nonetheless exists a 
genuine dispute of fact that does not conform precisely to the narrative that the 
plaintiff has advanced. 
Another district court in Nebraska has interpreted the “blatantly contra-
dicts” language to hold that “when [the] record, viewed in its entirety, clearly 
contradicts one non-moving party’s account of disputed events or facts, [the] 
court need not weigh [the] facts in [that] party’s favor at summary judgment.”54 
In that same paragraph, the court makes explicit the transformation of the 
standard, quoting Scott’s language about the non-moving party enjoying defer-
ence “only if there is a genuine dispute as to [the] facts” and then writing: 
“Otherwise, where the Court finds that ‘the record taken as a whole could not 
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party’—where there is no 
‘genuine issue for trial’—summary judgment is appropriate.”55 A district court 
in New Mexico, following direction from the Tenth Circuit, qualified its recita-
tion of the established standard of deference to non-moving parties at summary 
judgment in a similar fashion, saying: 
There are, however, limited circumstances in which the Court may disregard 
a party’s version of the facts. This doctrine developed most robustly in the quali-
fied-immunity arena. In Scott v. Harris, the Supreme Court concluded that 
summary judgment was appropriate where video evidence “quite clearly contra-
dicted” the plaintiff’s version of the facts.56 
                                                                                                                                
High-Speed Police Pursuits, the Fourth Amendment, and Scott v. Harris, 85 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 463, 473 (2007). 
53  Obester v. Lucas Assocs., Inc., No. 1:08-CV-03491-MHS-AJB, 2010 WL 8292401, at *9 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2010) (citation omitted) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). 
54  Marksmeier v. Davie, No. 8:09CV30, 2009 WL 2396845, at *4 (D. Neb. July 30, 2009) 
(providing a parenthetical description of Scott, 550 U.S. 372). 
55  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 
(1986)). 
56  Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 41 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1246 (D.N.M. 2014) (emphasis add-
ed) (citation omitted). 
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And a district court in Tennessee, finding that an inmate was not entitled to 
a trial on his claim that prison guards had set him up to be assaulted by fellow 
inmates, said this about the standard that led it to disregard the plaintiff’s affi-
davit: “Ultimately, if no genuine issue of material fact is raised by the nonmov-
ing party, the Court must not view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, and summary judgment must be granted.”57 Applying this 
newfound freedom in a particularly explicit fashion, the court reviewed the rec-
ord evidence that contradicted the inmate’s affidavit and concluded: “As such, 
when no genuine issue of fact is presented, the Court may not view the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”58 
Otherwise. However. May not. Must not. These are the words of qualifica-
tion that indicate that a standard is eroding, and the erosion that has followed 
the Court’s decision in Scott has been swift. This is not to impugn the outcomes 
in these particular cases. For example, in Maclin v. Tipton County, the Tennes-
see case involving an alleged conspiracy by prison officials, the analysis turned 
on the date when the events in question may have occurred and whether the 
claim had satisfied the statute of limitations. The inmate’s minimal affidavit 
was the sole evidence offered to refute extensive, objectively verifiable proof 
that the events took place at an earlier time than he claimed, and indeed that the 
inmate was no longer incarcerated on the date that would have permitted his 
claim to be timely.59 Courts have long grappled with the question of when it is 
appropriate to discredit a claimant’s stand-alone affidavit during summary 
judgment in the face of significant contradictory evidence, and Maclin was cer-
tainly a strong candidate. But a correct result in a particular case does not cure 
the improper erosion of an evidentiary standard. The Tennessee district court 
discounted the inmate’s affidavit without viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to him. It should have reached that result only after drawing all rea-
sonable inferences in his favor—reasonable inferences, not fanciful inferences, 
but inferences to which a non-movant is always entitled and that claimants are 
increasingly being denied following Scott. In the delicate business of scrutiniz-
ing a record and deciding when sympathetic treatment of a plaintiff by a jury 
would be unreasonable, the formulation of the standard that guides the judge’s 
analysis is a high stakes matter. 
Since handing down its decision in Scott, the Court has not disavowed this 
erosion of the summary judgment standard or admitted error in its formulation. 
But neither has it squarely embraced the revolution that its new account of the 
standard seems to represent. Instead, it has offered an ambiguous gesture of 
mitigation. During the 2013–2014 Term, the Court heard two more police ex-
cessive force cases. In one, Tolan v. Cotton,60 it granted certiorari solely to cor-
                                                        
57  Maclin v. Tipton Cnty., No. 2:10-cv-02468-cgc, 2011 WL 130161, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. 
Jan. 14, 2011) (emphasis added). 
58  Id. (emphasis added). 
59  Id. at *1–2. 
60  Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (per curiam). 
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rect the error of the Fifth Circuit in failing to accord proper deference to the 
non-moving party—an action that Justices Alito and Scalia protested.61 The 
case involved the shooting of an unarmed man, Robert Tolan, whom police had 
found standing on the porch of his parents’ home. The claim of excessive force 
turned on conflicting testimony from Tolan, his family, and the officer who 
shot him concerning the manner in which the police treated Tolan’s mother 
during the arrest and the manner in which Tolan responded.62 In granting sum-
mary judgment to the officer on qualified immunity grounds, the Court ex-
plained, the lower courts had “credited the evidence of the party seeking sum-
mary judgment and failed properly to acknowledge key evidence offered by the 
party opposing that motion”—an action that the Court called “a clear misap-
prehension of summary judgment standards in light of our precedents.”63 It 
took the case and reversed summarily in order to correct that clear misappre-
hension.64 (The second case, Plumhoff v. Rickard, also reiterated the traditional 
formulation of the summary judgment standard, but it reversed the rulings of 
the lower federal courts and relied explicitly upon Scott in doing so. That case 
is discussed in the next section.) 
Did the Court summarily reverse the Fifth Circuit in Tolan in order to send 
a message about the continuing importance of deferring to non-moving parties 
in the wake of Scott? The separate opinion of Justices Alito and Scalia does 
suggest that there was some message-sending agenda behind the granting of the 
petition. Will that mitigating gesture blunt Scott’s impact on summary judg-
ment practice? I am skeptical. The ruling of the Fifth Circuit in Tolan was so 
obviously incorrect that the rebuke of a summary reversal does little to clarify 
the proper boundaries of the standard. The Court made a similar gesture in the 
pleadings context with Erickson v. Pardus, just two weeks after its ruling in 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, granting the petition over Justice Scalia’s dissent and 
summarily reversing the Tenth Circuit’s dismissal of a prisoner’s complaint be-
cause the ruling below had “depart[ed] in so stark a manner from the pleading 
standard mandated by the Federal Rules.”65 Commentators pointed to Erickson 
as a reason to hope that the Court would retreat from the broad implications of 
Twombly, but those hopes quickly proved unfounded.66 At best, Erickson 
stands as a reminder that even a radical shift in the pleading standard leaves a 
line that cannot be crossed. Tolan may amount to little more for summary 
judgment. 
                                                        
61  See id. at 1868–69 (Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s decision to grant review 
in the case, though agreeing with its disposition). 
62  Id. at 1863–64 (majority opinion). 
63  Id. at 1867–68. 
64  See id. at 1868 (identifying this departure from precedents as the reason for intervening in 
the case). 
65  Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90 (2007) (per curiam). 
66  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (expanding the scope of the new plausibility 
standard that Twombly introduced into federal pleadings). 
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II. SCOTT V. HARRIS AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE 
The majority’s treatment of appellate jurisdiction in Scott is less explicit 
than its frontal assault on the presumption in favor of the non-moving party, but 
the shift in paradigm that the opinion may herald is no less dramatic. And, im-
portantly, the two issues are analytically linked. The majority’s reframing of 
the summary judgment standard in Scott is the device by which it silently justi-
fies the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, despite the barriers the Court had 
erected in earlier cases. The result is a reformulation of the collateral order doc-
trine that may fatally undermine the restraints that have previously prevented 
government defendants who assert qualified immunity from pursuing immedi-
ate appeals where they dispute the inferences that can reasonably be drawn 
from a contested factual record. 
The final judgment rule ordinarily prohibits a party from taking an imme-
diate appeal from the denial of a dispositive motion.67 In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
however, the Court carved out a limited exception for qualified immunity cas-
es, permitting immediate appeals from a denial of a defendant’s motion to dis-
miss or motion for summary judgment through the use of the collateral order 
doctrine.68 The case involved claims against John Mitchell, Attorney General of 
the United States under President Richard Nixon, brought by a plaintiff who 
learned that Mitchell had authorized illegal warrantless wiretaps against him. 
Mitchell attempted to assert an absolute immunity defense and, in the alterna-
tive, claimed qualified immunity. On cross motions for summary judgment, the 
district court found that Mitchell was only entitled to claim qualified immunity, 
which the lower court measured against his actual knowledge and good faith, 
and it denied both motions for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues 
of fact remained as to Mitchell’s state of mind.69 On appeal, the Court affirmed 
the rejection of absolute immunity but clarified that the standard for qualified 
immunity poses a question of objective reasonableness rather than subjective 
good faith and found that Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity under 
that standard.70 
Mitchell presented a record in which the factual issues that the Court de-
termined to be relevant to the immunity question—the circumstances surround-
ing the Attorney General’s authorization of the warrantless wiretap, as distinct 
from his state of mind when doing so—were acknowledged by all parties to be 
undisputed.71 In such a case, the Court held, an immediate appeal from “a dis-
                                                        
67  See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”). 
68  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
69  Id. at 514–16. 
70  Id. at 530–36. 
71  The majority in Mitchell was a bit opaque about this feature of the case, but it is clear 
when viewed in the full context and subsequent treatment of the opinion. After discussing 
the various circumstances in which a district court might deny summary judgment, some of 
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trict court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity [is warranted] to the extent 
that it turns on an issue of law”72—by which the Court meant an abstract issue 
of legal doctrine measured against an agreed upon set of undisputed facts.73 
Ten years later, in Johnson v. Jones, the Court limited the potential scope 
of the Mitchell doctrine. The plaintiff’s claim in Johnson centered on charges 
that five police officers had used excessive force while arresting him and had 
beaten him while he was in custody at the station. If Johnson’s allegations were 
true, then there was no question of qualified immunity: the prohibition against 
gratuitous physical torture is well established. The dispute in the case con-
cerned the events surrounding the plaintiff’s arrest. Three of the officers admit-
ted that they were present when Johnson was arrested and were in the vicinity 
of the room where he claimed he was beaten, but they denied assaulting him. 
Johnson pointed to his injuries and relied upon circumstantial evidence to assert 
that all five officers had either beaten him or “ ‘stood by and allowed others to 
beat’ ” him, either of which he claimed would violate clearly established law.74 
The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment, and the 
officers attempted an immediate appeal. The Court took the case to consider 
whether the collateral order doctrine was available when a district court denied 
a motion for summary judgment on grounds of “evidence insufficiency.”75 It 
concluded the answer was no. 
                                                                                                                                
which involving a dispute on the underlying facts, the Court settled upon the following de-
scription of the scenario for which it was authorizing an immediate appeal: 
An appellate court reviewing the denial of the defendant’s claim of immunity need not consider 
the correctness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts, nor even determine whether the plaintiff’s 
allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a question of law: whether the legal 
norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged 
actions or, in cases where the district court has denied summary judgment for the defendant on 
the ground that even under the defendant’s version of the facts the defendant’s conduct violated 
clearly established law, whether the law clearly proscribed the actions the defendant claims he 
took. 
Id. at 528. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent and apparently seeking to map out the limits of 
the Court’s holding, emphasized repeatedly that the Court’s ruling spoke only to a case in 
which the material facts were undisputed. See, e.g., id. at 556 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) 
(“Even if I agreed with the Court’s conclusion that denials of qualified immunity that rest on 
undisputed facts were immediately appealable and further agreed with its conclusion that 
Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity . . . .”). Finally, in its subsequent and unanimous 
ruling in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), the Court acknowledged that there was 
“some language in the opinion that sounds as if it might imply the contrary,” but reaffirmed 
that Mitchell dealt only with a case in which an appellate court “ ‘need not consider the cor-
rectness of the plaintiff’s version of the facts.’ ” Id. at 313–14 (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 
528); see also id. at 311 (“[T]he issue appealed [in Mitchell] concerned, not which facts the 
parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a viola-
tion of ‘clearly established’ law.”). 
72  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. 
73  Id. at 528 (authorizing immediate appeal in cases where “the defendant’s version of the 
facts” is accepted and the district court nonetheless finds that “the defendant’s conduct vio-
lated clearly established law”). 
74  Johnson, 515 U.S. at 307–08 (quoting Application to Petition for Certiorari at 7a). 
75  Id. at 308, 313. 
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The collateral order doctrine emphasizes “separability,” requiring that the 
subject of an immediate appeal “involve[] issues significantly different from 
those that underlie the plaintiff’s basic case.”76 The appellants in Mitchell satis-
fied that requirement by defining the issue on appeal as whether an agreed-
upon set of facts violated legal doctrine that was clearly established at the time 
of the relevant events. The issue for decision was an assessment of the clarity 
of constitutional doctrine at the time of the events. That question, though inevi-
tably overlapping with the underlying merits of the dispute, was analytically 
distinct and, more important, would not require the appellate courts to repeat 
their efforts if they affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the merits and 
then heard a subsequent appeal on the underlying claim after entry of final 
judgment following remand. 
This separability is not present when the disagreement of the parties cen-
ters on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s allegations. 
Whether a discovery record raises a genuine dispute of material fact is still a 
question of law, of course.77 But the overlap of that determination with the un-
derlying merits of the dispute is significant and unavoidable. The Johnson 
Court explained: 
Where . . . a defendant simply wants to appeal a district court’s determination 
that the evidence is sufficient to permit a particular finding of fact after trial, it 
will often prove difficult to find any such “separate” question—one that is sig-
nificantly different from the fact-related legal issues that likely underlie the 
plaintiff’s claim on the merits.78 
When combined with the lack of any “comparative expertise” on the part 
of appellate judges to assess a discovery record and the potential for the inquiry 
to “seem nebulous” in complex cases,79 the justification for an immediate ap-
peal in this large category of qualified immunity cases becomes significantly 
weaker. Because appellate courts must “decide appealability for categories of 
orders rather than individual orders” and not “in each individual case engage in 
ad hoc balancing” on such questions, the Court found, interlocutory appeals on 
qualified immunity must be “ ‘limited to cases presenting neat abstract issues of 
law.’ ”80 The Court concluded its analysis with a seemingly unequivocal state-
ment of its unanimous holding: “a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified im-
munity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order in-
sofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 
‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.”81 
                                                        
76  Id. at 313–14. 
77  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (defining the genuine issue of 
material fact standard). 
78  Johnson, 515 U.S. at 314. 
79  Id. at 316. 
80  Id. at 315, 317 (quoting 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.10, at 664). 
81  Id. at 319–20. 
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Johnson created an obvious problem for the Court in Scott v. Harris. The 
appeal in Scott did not come to the Court on a stipulated set of facts or as a pure 
question of law measured against an assumed record. Scott involved a dispute 
over the record itself. The disagreement between the parties centered on the 
magnitude of the danger that Harris’s flight posed to the public, the risk of 
harm to other vehicles and pedestrians, and the conditions surrounding the de-
cision by the officers to employ deadly force to stop his car—“the existence, or 
nonexistence, of a triable issue of fact,” which the Johnson Court identified as 
“the kind of issue . . . [as to which] appellate judges enjoy no comparative ex-
pertise.”82 Nonetheless, the Court did not explain how the interlocutory appeal 
in Scott was consistent with Johnson. Indeed, it did not even cite Johnson, 
providing only a generic reference to Mitchell v. Forsyth in a footnote as the 
entirety of its appellate jurisdiction analysis.83 The omission was striking. 
In Behrens v. Pelletier,84 another qualified immunity case decided the 
Term following Johnson, the Court further refined its collateral order doctrine 
in terms that further illustrate Scott’s destabilizing potential. Behrens involved 
a Bivens claim brought by a financial manager, Pelletier, against Behrens, a su-
pervisory agent with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Behrens was respon-
sible for terminating Pelletier from a management position in a failing institu-
tion, and Pelletier alleged various constitutional violations. The issue in the 
case was whether an official claiming qualified immunity could pursue two 
successive interlocutory appeals, one from an order denying a motion to dis-
miss and another from a later order denying a motion for summary judgment. 
The Ninth Circuit had held that only one such appeal was available under 
Mitchell and Johnson, but the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that both 
rulings were appealable collateral orders and that the imperative to spare gov-
ernment officials from unwarranted discovery as well as unwarranted trial justi-
fied multiple successive appeals.85 
One of the concerns that had led the court of appeals to prohibit this ag-
gressive use of the collateral order doctrine was the “concern that a second ap-
peal would tend to have the illegitimate purpose of delaying the proceedings.”86 
The Court acknowledged the potential for abuse and it reiterated the “ ‘powers 
of the courts of appeals to establish summary procedures and calendars to weed 
out frivolous claims,’ ” procedures that the courts below had followed.87 But the 
Court then dismissed the significance of this factor to the jurisdictional inquiry, 
reiterating that questions of appellate jurisdiction must be answered in strictly 
categorical terms, even when individual cases that appear frivolous might pre-
sent attractive candidates for ad hoc exceptions. 
                                                        
82  Id. at 316. 
83  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 n.2 (2007). 
84  Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996). 
85  Id. at 301–05. 
86  Id. at 310. 
87  Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977)). 
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In any event, the question before us here—whether there is jurisdiction over the 
appeal, as opposed to whether the appeal is frivolous—must be determined by 
focusing upon the category of order appealed from, rather than upon the strength 
of the grounds for reversing the order. “Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts 
of a particular case.” As we have said, an order denying qualified immunity, to 
the extent it turns on an “issue of law,” is immediately appealable.88 
Consider the implications of this mode of analysis for the Court’s holding 
in Scott v. Harris. Even if the majority believed that Victor Harris’s factual 
contentions regarding danger to other drivers, risk to pedestrians and the like 
were frivolous, Behrens tells us that “the question before [the Court]—whether 
there is jurisdiction over the appeal, as opposed to whether the appeal is frivo-
lous—must be determined by focusing upon the category of order appealed 
from, rather than upon the strength of the grounds for reversing the order.”89 
Under Behrens, an appellate court may only hear an appeal from a denial of 
summary judgment if “the category of order appealed from” justifies the exer-
cise of jurisdiction. Scott justified its refusal to grant the plaintiff the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences by describing the plaintiff’s version of the facts as 
“blatantly contradicted” by the record. In such a case, the Court held, no genu-
ine question exists that requires deference to the non-moving party. On this 
view, “blatantly contradicts” cases receive qualitatively different treatment un-
der the core summary judgment standard—they are a different category of case. 
What appears to follow is that a denial of summary judgment that “blatant-
ly contradicts” the record in a qualified immunity case is a distinct category of 
order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, as well. It is different from an ordi-
nary dispute over contested facts, and different even from a dispute over con-
tested facts in which the position of the plaintiff opposing the motion is frivo-
lous. No other account of the appeal in Scott can square the exercise of 
jurisdiction in that case with the Court’s strong and unqualified statements in 
Behrens. Several circuit courts have already adopted such a reading, treating 
Scott as having silently crafted a categorical “exception” to the Johnson doc-
trine for “blatantly contradicted” facts.90 
The Court itself has not yet acknowledged the problem it has created, nor 
has it provided any substantial guidance. It certainly has not instructed lower 
federal courts how they should distinguish between a “frivolous” position on 
the state of the factual record from a position that “blatantly contradicts” that 
record, as Behrens and Scott now appear to require. Rather, the Court’s only 
post-Scott statement on appellate jurisdiction following a denial of summary 
judgment reaffirms the result in Scott while offering no analytical direction for 
the new paradigm that it appears to have embraced. 
                                                        
88  Id. at 311 (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 315 (1995) (“We 
of course decide appealability for categories of orders rather than individual orders.”). 
89  Behrens, 516 U.S. at 311. 
90  See, e.g., Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2009); Blaylock v. 
City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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In Plumhoff v. Rickard, the Court heard an appeal from a dispute involving 
a fatal shooting in a high-speed police chase.91 The driver, Rickard, was killed 
along with his passenger when police shot into the car fifteen times as Rickard 
attempted to flee after having been brought to a stop and surrounded. Officers 
shot three times into the car while Rickard was trapped, then a dozen more 
times after he pulled the car around and attempted to escape once again. The 
driver’s heir brought suit, claiming excessive force—in particular, that the 
twelve shots that the police fired as the car was driving away were unjusti-
fied—and the district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the evidence was inconclusive about the risk that the driver posed 
to the officers and to the public.92 The Sixth Circuit heard an immediate appeal 
from the denial of the officers’ motion. Before turning to the Supreme Court’s 
ultimate treatment of the issue, it is worth examining how events unfolded in 
the court of appeals, for that court’s disposition of the appeal exemplifies the 
dilemma confronting lower federal courts following Scott. 
In an earlier decision, the Sixth Circuit had found that Scott created an im-
plicit category of exceptions to the Johnson doctrine that permits an immediate 
appeal on the grounds that the discovery record “blatantly contradicts” the rul-
ing of the district court.93 The officers in Plumhoff invoked that doctrine as the 
basis for their interlocutory appeal. A motions panel of the Sixth Circuit initial-
ly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Johnson, but then vacated 
its ruling and transferred the entire case to a merits panel. The merits panel 
concluded that the record evidence, which included partial video footage of the 
shooting,94 supported the district court’s conclusion that reasonable jurors could 
disagree about the level of danger that Rickard posed and hence the reasona-
bleness of the officers’ use of multiple gunshots to end the incident. A fortiori, 
the court found that the district court’s ruling did not “blatantly contradict” the 
discovery record.95 It then confronted the question of what disposition was ap-
propriate in light of that conclusion, since its conclusion that that the district 
court’s ruling did not “blatantly contradict” the record would seem to indicate 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal at all. 
Usually, when we review an appeal from a denial of qualified immunity, we 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction if the immunity was denied on the ba-
sis of genuine factual disputes. After Scott, however, it would appear that an in-
                                                        
91  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014). 
92  Id. at 2017–18. 
93  See Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 370–71 (setting forth a “blatantly and demonstrably false” 
exception to the Johnson doctrine). 
94  Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2021. Portions of the video are incorporated into a CNN news re-
port about the case. See Police Appeal Suit for Deadly Force During Chase!, YOUTUBE 
(Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JTfGkVQz208. 
95  See Estate of Allen v. City of West Memphis, 509 Fed. Appx. 388, 389–91 (6th Cir. 
2012), (describing the litigation position of the officers and the sequence of events before the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals), rev’d sub nom. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 
(2014). 
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terlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity which makes a good faith 
Scott claim requires us to review the record. After this review if we reach the 
same conclusion as did the district judge, as we do here, it would seem that what 
we are doing is affirming that judgment. Whether we call it a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or an affirmance of the denial of qualified immunity, the result is 
the same.96 
The Sixth Circuit’s attempt to navigate this doctrinal conundrum fails to 
grasp the extent of the problem. Once a case is before a merits panel on appeal 
in a given case, it may be correct that dismissing for lack of jurisdiction is func-
tionally indistinguishable from affirming the denial of qualified immunity. Both 
dispositions result in a remand to the district court for trial. But what are the 
systemic implications of this new category of collateral order appeal? Does the 
interlocutory jurisdiction of a federal appellate court in a qualified immunity 
case now turn on whether a government official can assert a “good faith” ar-
gument that the district court’s ruling is not merely incorrect but stands in bla-
tant contradiction of the record, as the Sixth Circuit suggests? What is the ob-
jective standard for distinguishing between an “ordinary” case in which an 
appeals court might disagree with the district court’s assessment of the reason-
able inferences that the record can support but would have no jurisdiction to 
review that ruling under Johnson, and a Scott case in which the defendant can 
say “in good faith” that the district court was so wrong as to blatantly contradict 
the record, thereby conferring jurisdiction for an immediate appeal? Since the 
appellate court’s jurisdiction in such a case depends upon the “blatantly contra-
dicts” standard, how should the court go about conducting its review on the 
merits? If the appeals court concludes that the district court was incorrect in its 
summary judgment ruling but cannot say that its ruling “blatantly contradicted” 
the record—assuming for the moment that such a fine distinction is one that 
appellate courts could actually administer—what is the appropriate disposition? 
Should the appellate court issue a ruling on the merits even so, reverse the dis-
trict court, and dismiss the case, thereby giving the defendant the interlocutory 
relief on a fact-intensive dispute that Johnson had previously foreclosed? Or 
should the appellate court dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and send the case 
back to the district court for trial, even though the appellate court—having con-
ducted a detailed review of the record—does not believe that any trial should 
occur, wasting the time and effort that the appellate court will have expended in 
the thorough review of the record necessitated by the first appeal? In either cir-
cumstance, the appellate courts have been forced to assume the institutional 
costs that Johnson insisted upon avoiding. The Court’s treatment of the collat-
eral order doctrine in Scott does not merely craft a narrow exception to the rule 
in Johnson. In practical terms, it threatens to eviscerate that rule in qualified 
immunity cases. How are the lower federal courts to avoid the doctrinal colli-
sion that these two rulings have provoked? 
                                                        
96  Id. at 393 (citations omitted). 
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The Supreme Court provided none of these answers when it heard the ap-
peal in Plumhoff, reversing the Sixth Circuit on the merits of its summary 
judgment ruling (and once again disagreeing sharply with all the lower federal 
court judges in their assessment of the record evidence in a police car-chase 
dispute). Its opinion therefore does not address the question of how an appellate 
court should respond when a defendant improperly invokes this new collateral 
order doctrine, nor even what standard applies to that threshold determination. 
The Court’s opinion does take up the issue of appellate jurisdiction in an af-
firmative posture, but its discussion sheds little light. After describing the ba-
sics of the collateral order doctrine in qualified immunity cases and summariz-
ing the limits that Johnson places on that doctrine, the Court offers these two 
paragraphs to explain the propriety of appellate jurisdiction in Plumhoff. 
The District Court order in this case is nothing like the order in Johnson. Pe-
titioners do not claim that other officers were responsible for shooting Rickard; 
rather, they contend that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
and, in any event, did not violate clearly established law. Thus, they raise legal 
issues; these issues are quite different from any purely factual issues that the trial 
court might confront if the case were tried; deciding legal issues of this sort is a 
core responsibility of appellate courts, and requiring appellate courts to decide 
such issues is not an undue burden. 
The District Court order here is not materially distinguishable from the Dis-
trict Court order in Scott v. Harris, and in that case we expressed no doubts 
about the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under [28 U.S.C.] § 1291. Accord-
ingly, here, as in Scott, we hold that the Court of Appeals properly exercised ju-
risdiction, and we therefore turn to the merits.97 
“Confounding” would be a polite term for this explanation; “nonsense” 
might be closer to the mark. The first paragraph flatly mischaracterizes the rul-
ing of the district court and the court of appeals, both of which centered on the 
extent of the danger that Rickard presented to the officers and the public when 
his car was trapped by police and the circumstances surrounding the decision of 
the officers to shoot into the car a dozen times when Rickard began to escape. 
These are questions of fact, and they were actively contested. The case was not 
presented to the lower courts on the basis of stipulated or agreed upon facts as a 
pure question of Fourth Amendment law or qualified immunity, as the Court’s 
description suggests. The second paragraph then invokes Scott. Never mind 
whether the order under review in Plumhoff was “not materially distinguisha-
ble” from the order in Scott, as the Court asserts. The citation to Scott is analyt-
ically empty, for the Court did not provide any analysis of appellate jurisdiction 
in that case. Scott contains only a boilerplate citation to Mitchell v. Forsyth and 
no discussion of Johnson at all.98 On this important and unsettled question of 
appellate jurisdiction, Plumhoff essentially says, “We did this in Scott—though 
we did not tell you why—so now we’re going to do it again.” This succession 
of empty rulings calls to mind the trenchant words of Justice Souter dissenting 
                                                        
97  Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2019–20. 
98  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 n.2 (2007). 
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in Alden v. Maine: “The sequence of the Court’s positions prompts a suspicion 
of error, and skepticism is confirmed by scrutiny of the Court’s efforts to justify 
its holding.”99 
One key element of the Court’s deflection of the appellate jurisdiction 
question in Plumhoff warrants particular attention. It appears in the first para-
graph of the passage quoted above, where the Court characterizes the disputed 
issue in the case as purely “legal” in nature and “quite different from any purely 
factual issues that the trial court might confront if the case were tried.”100 Es-
chewing the language of “blatant contradiction,” the Court instead focuses on 
the nature of the Fourth Amendment inquiry underlying the plaintiff’s claim. 
That maneuver exemplifies a third major element of the network of doctrines 
that Scott has helped to shift: the pressure that qualified immunity places upon 
courts to treat factual disputes as questions of law appropriate for summary ju-
dicial resolution, particularly in cases that assert claims of improper search or 
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
III. SCOTT V. HARRIS AND THE CATEGORIZATION OF THE  
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE 
The shifts that Scott v. Harris has set in motion in summary judgment and 
interlocutory appellate review are striking. But the fault lines that made those 
shifts possible were already buried within the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
Two elements of the qualified immunity defense apply pressure for just the 
kind of change that the Court has initiated in Scott. 
A. The Plaintiff’s Version of Events and Clearly Established Law 
The first element of the doctrine relates to the “plaintiff’s version of 
events” approach to framing a summary judgment inquiry, discussed in Part I. 
Qualified immunity requires a court to determine whether the illegality of an 
officer’s conduct was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged events. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald makes clear that the standard by which that clarity is 
measured is an objective one—the state of the law that a reasonable official 
would have known, as reflected in binding precedent—rather than a subjective 
standard that measures good faith.101 This formulation of the standard pushes 
trial courts to adopt a single version of events against which they can perform 
the comparison with established case law. 
                                                        
99  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 761 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
100  Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2019. 
101  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (rejecting standard of malice or sub-
jective bad faith and holding that “government officials performing discretionary functions, 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known”). 
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If a court is confronted with a discovery record that contains many ambigu-
ities and might allow for multiple variations on the unfolding of the key events 
in the dispute, how can it decide whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a 
genuine dispute about whether the actions of the officer violated clearly estab-
lished law? In such a case, it is not enough to find that there are genuine ques-
tions about whether the officer engaged in one of several possible courses of 
conduct that would violate the Constitution or a federal statute. Harlow entitles 
the officer to escape the burden of trial unless there is competent evidence that 
he violated specifically identified norms that were clearly established at the 
time of the incident. It is often difficult for a trial court to perform this analysis 
against a range of possible interpretations of a discovery record, attempting to 
measure multiple factual inferences against clearly established law. The task is 
all the more difficult for an appeals court, further removed from the record and 
the manner in which it took shape. There is an inherent tension between the 
range of inferences to which a plaintiff should be entitled at summary judgment 
and the task of administering a claim of qualified immunity when confronted 
with an ambiguous record. 
A decision from the Sixth Circuit illustrates the interaction of these forces. 
In Romo v. Largen, the court heard an interlocutory appeal from an order deny-
ing summary judgment in a suit alleging false arrest by a police officer.102 The 
officer, Largen, found the plaintiff, Romo, in his parked truck sleeping off a 
night of drinking. Largen claimed to have seen Romo’s truck passing another 
vehicle in a dangerous fashion moments before finding him in the parking lot. 
When confronted, Romo denied the accusation, explaining that he had been 
resting in his truck all night and did not even have the keys, which his brother 
had taken before leaving Romo to sleep off the alcohol. Largen also claimed 
that the hood of Romo’s car was warm despite the chilly weather, indicating 
that the engine had recently been running. He arrested Romo for drunk driving. 
As he took Romo into custody, he looked for the keys to the truck but could not 
find them. At the station, he filed a police report in which he claimed that he 
had executed a U-turn to follow Romo’s truck when he saw it perform the dan-
gerous maneuver “and then pulled behind it . . . into the parking lot” where it 
stopped, never losing sight of the vehicle. Later, however, Officer Largen 
changed his account, admitting that he did not actually follow the truck but 
“lost sight of it” between the time of the dangerous maneuver and the time that 
he came upon Romo in the parking lot. Romo continued to deny all these asser-
tions and insisted that Largen was lying about the hood of his truck being 
warm. Law enforcement officials eventually conceded that Romo had not been 
driving his truck at all when Largen arrested him.103 Romo then sued for arrest 
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                        
102  Romo v. Largen, 723 F.3d 670, 674 (6th Cir. 2013). 
103  See id. at 673. 
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The district court’s review of the testimony and other evidence led it to 
conclude that there were “at least three basic narratives possible from what’s 
going on here,” as the Sixth Circuit summarized when describing the record 
compiled below: 
The first [possibility] is that Largen fabricated the background story. That he 
never really did see a truck pass a semi on the right over the railroad track . . . 
[and] simply happened upon this truck in a parking lot, [saw] somebody sleeping 
in there, and then . . . made up the whole [rest of the] story. . . . 
. . . . 
The second possible narrative is that Largen’s story, including the warm 
hood, is entirely correct. . . . 
. . . [O]n the third possible narrative . . . Largen made up the part about the 
warm hood and the warm engine, but then he really did see a Dodge truck pull 
alongside the semi on the railroad tracks, saw it in his rear-view mirror, but 
didn’t have continuous contact, and the colors of the trucks were different.104 
The district court found that the record left genuine questions about which 
of these possible stories might be correct, and it denied summary judgment. On 
the question of qualified immunity, the district court did not provide a detailed 
analysis of the various scenarios as measured against controlling case law on 
probable cause. Rather, the court explained its order from the bench as follows: 
“[O]n the facts of this case there’s enough uniqueness, enough in the mix to say 
that the question of whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly conclud-
ed there was probable cause should go to the jury, and that’s really what it looks 
like to me.” . . . “[I]t’s not some big glaring thing I can point to, but it’s my 
whole parsing of the record and collection of these significant little things that 
add up to a fairly big significant hole, I think, in the defense theory on this for 
summary judgment.”105 
In his appeal, Largen asserted that he was entitled to qualified immunity on 
either the second or the third scenario, emphasizing that a “reasonable but mis-
taken belief that Romo was driving the pickup truck [he] observed commit a 
traffic violation” would entitle him to the protection of qualified immunity. He 
insisted that the record could not lead a reasonable jury to conclude that he had 
fabricated his entire story.106 
The Sixth Circuit declined to undertake a careful parsing of these scenari-
os, finding that “the district court’s treatment of the first scenario is sufficient 
for affirmance” because the appellate court was “required by the limitations on 
interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity denials to accept the district court’s 
finding that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether Largen fab-
ricated the whole or a part of his story.”107 But the district court did not find 
that there was a genuine dispute as to whether Officer Largen made up his story 
                                                        
104  Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
105  Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellant at 7–8, Romo, 723 F.3d 670 (No. 12-1870), 
2012 WL 4835377, at *8 (quoting District Court Transcript). 
106  Romo, 723 F.3d at 674. 
107  Id. 
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altogether. Its ruling was more amorphous. And the difference between a com-
plete fabrication and a partial fabrication could have been dispositive. Finding a 
man in a parked truck and making up a story to justify a drunk driving arrest is 
clearly an unconstitutional false arrest under established precedent. Making a 
reasonable mistake about whether a drunk man sitting in a parked car had just 
been involved in a dangerous driving incident and then inventing some details 
in hopes of covering up misplaced bravado at the arrest scene is a closer call 
and may not have constituted a clearly established case of false arrest, even 
though the fabrications themselves were clearly improper. 
Perhaps there was a genuine dispute as to whether Officer Largen made up 
his entire story, or at least whether he invented enough of the details to make 
clear that the arrest was improper under established law. But neither the district 
court nor the Sixth Circuit parsed the record closely enough to provide confi-
dence in that result. The demands of the qualified immunity doctrine place 
pressure upon courts to force an ambiguous factual record into neat lines by in-
sisting that the plaintiff select one “version of events” to compare against clear-
ly established law. When courts resist that pressure, as in Romo, the results can 
be analytically unsatisfying. The dilemma is inherent to the structure of quali-
fied immunity doctrine. 
The attentive reader will also ask how this case was before the Sixth Cir-
cuit on interlocutory appeal in the first place. The appeal involved an ambigu-
ous record as to which the district court had found a basis for genuine dispute 
concerning the competing stories of the parties.108 The Sixth Circuit did not 
find that the record “blatantly contradicted” the district court’s conclusion, nor 
even that the defendant had made a good faith argument to that effect.109 Why 
did Johnson not foreclose this appeal? Here too the Sixth Circuit relied upon 
the “plaintiff’s version of events,” this time to justify its own appellate authori-
ty. The court behaved as though Largen had accepted Romo’s narrative in its 
entirety and had argued that qualified immunity should shield him from liabil-
ity even if he had invented his entire story. Largen argued no such thing. He 
based his appeal on the assertion that he saw a truck driving dangerously and 
made a reasonable mistake in believing that Romo was the driver.110 But the 
Sixth Circuit would have lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal if it had recog-
nized that there was a genuine dispute about which version of events was true, 
with some versions supporting a violation of clearly established law and other 
versions leaving room for doubt, so it forced the case into a simplified frame 
and improperly heard the appeal rather than dismissing for lack of jurisdiction 
with a one-line citation to Johnson. The same force that pushes courts to use a 
single version of events as their point of reference in performing the qualified 
                                                        
108  See supra text accompanying notes 102–05. 
109  See supra text accompanying note 107; see also Estate of Allen v. City of West Mem-
phis, 509 Fed. Appx. 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2012) (defining “good faith” standard for appeals 
based on Scott v. Harris). 
110  See Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 105, at 22. 
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immunity analysis also encourages them to hear interlocutory appeals on the 
merits where the only appropriate course of action is to dismiss.111 
Justice Scalia was not wrong when he wrote in Scott that reading the record 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in a qualified immunity 
case “usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts.”112 As a 
practical matter, adopting the plaintiff’s version of events and asking whether it 
is supported by competent evidence is the easiest way to undertake the compar-
ison that qualified immunity requires between a factual record and the fact-
patterns in the applicable precedent. But structuring the analysis in that manner 
will often lead courts to force an ambiguous record into boxes with artificially 
crisp lines and neat corners. The advent of the “blatantly contradicts” doctrine 
promises to embolden appellate courts to exercise even broader jurisdiction and 
undertake yet more aggressive review of summary judgment denials, as the 
Court itself did in Scott and Plumhoff. 
B. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment 
The second fault-line in qualified immunity doctrine relates to the underly-
ing substantive law that frequently controls in cases where the defense is as-
serted: the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”113 What type of question does this reasonableness standard call 
upon a court to answer? Is it a question of law, or a question of fact? There is a 
neat theoretical answer to this question and a more complicated reality. One of 
the dynamics at work in cases like Scott v. Harris and Plumhoff v. Rickard is an 
attempt by the Supreme Court to force lower courts to adhere more closely to 
the neat theoretical account of the doctrine in this class of cases. 
                                                        
111  Judge Jeffrey Sutton wrote a long and forceful concurring opinion in Romo in which he 
argued that Scott imposed new constraints on Johnson, significantly expanding interlocutory 
appeals in qualified immunity cases. Judge Sutton believed that Johnson should be limited to 
the “prototypical ‘he said, she said’ fact disputes, in which the defendants . . . refuse to ac-
cept the truth of what the plaintiffs . . . say happened.” Romo, 723 F.3d at 678 (Sutton, J., 
concurring). In such cases, he said, appellate courts still lack interlocutory jurisdiction. In 
contrast, the Judge argued, “when a district court determines that there is a ‘genuine issue of 
fact’ for trial by drawing an inference in favor of the plaintiff”—rather than by relying upon 
the plaintiff’s testimony or other direct evidence—appellate courts should have the power to 
exercise interlocutory review. Id. Judge Sutton acknowledged that this reading of Johnson 
would makes its limitations “frequently inapplicable,” significantly increasing the power of 
appellate courts to hear interlocutory appeals in qualified immunity cases. But, he said, he 
offered the proposal “to salvage, not bury, the [Johnson] decision.” Id. at 687. Judge Sutton 
is correct that Scott poses a challenge to the stability of the Johnson doctrine, a challenge 
that has only intensified with the Court’s ruling in Plumhoff (decided after Romo). Indeed, 
the Sixth Circuit is one of the places of greatest instability at the moment because of the 
“good faith Scott claim” doctrine of appellate jurisdiction that it appears to have adopted. See 
Estate of Allen, 509 Fed. Appx. at 393. Whether Judge Sutton’s proposal to curtail Johnson 
and authorize a significantly larger number of interlocutory appeals represents the best solu-
tion to that challenge is far from clear. 
112  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). 
113  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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In theory, the reasonableness standard frames an objective legal standard. 
As the Court put the matter in Scott, “once we have determined the relevant set 
of facts . . . the reasonableness of [an officer’s] actions . . . is a pure question of 
law.”114 On this account, the finder of fact must assess the record and determine 
what actually happened in the disputed incident, but the court must make a “le-
gal” judgment about whether those events satisfy a reasonableness standard. At 
trial, this means that a judge should enter a directed verdict if she concludes 
that the facts urged by plaintiff, even if true, do not constitute objectively un-
reasonable actions by the defendant. At summary judgment, it means that the 
judge should enter judgment for the defendant if she concludes that the events 
as to which the plaintiff has shown a genuine dispute of fact would not entitle 
him to judgment even if proven.115 That is the theory. 
In practice, the administration of a Fourth Amendment claim is much less 
neat. As the Court has frequently said, the line between a question of law and a 
question of fact is often elusive. In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, for example, the 
Court acknowledged “the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of 
fact and questions of law” and the lack of clear guidance in drawing such dis-
tinctions in the administration of highly fact-bound standards.116 The Court 
went on to hold that the key question for decision in that case—whether a set of 
historical practices at a segregated manufacturing plant indicated that the em-
ployee seniority system was designed with an intent to disadvantage Black 
workers in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—was a pure question of 
fact, not a mixed question of fact and law, and hence was subject to deferential 
clear error review on appeal.117 In Brown v. Plata, the Court heard an appeal 
from the ruling of a three-judge panel finding that overcrowding in the Califor-
nia prison system had been the “primary cause” of Eighth Amendment viola-
tions, a requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PLRA”).118 Unlike in Pullman-Standard, the Court in Plata concluded that 
the ultimate issue in the case was a mixed question of fact and law. Even so, it 
found that deference was appropriate. 
With respect to the three-judge court’s factual findings, this Court’s review is 
necessarily deferential. It is not this Court’s place to duplicate the role of the tri-
al court. The ultimate issue of primary cause presents a mixed question of law 
and fact; but there, too, the mix weighs heavily on the fact side. Because the dis-
trict court is better positioned to decide the issue, our review of the three-judge 
court’s primary cause determination is deferential.119 
                                                        
114  Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8. 
115  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added). 
116  Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). 
117  Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6). 
118  Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) 
(2012) (“primary cause” requirement of the PLRA). 
119  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1932 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 
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The Court has acknowledged the difficulty of drawing this fact-law distinc-
tion since the Federal Rules first took effect. In a 1944 decision involving an 
attempt by the federal government to revoke an immigrant’s certificate of natu-
ralization, Baumgartner v. United States, the Court described the fluid nature of 
such determinations and the unhelpfulness of labels and theoretical categories, 
establishing a vocabulary that the Court continues to use in cases like Plata and 
Pullman-Standard. 
The phrase “finding of fact” may be a summary characterization of compli-
cated factors of varying significance for judgment. Such a “finding of fact” may 
be the ultimate judgment on a mass of details involving not merely an assess-
ment of the trustworthiness of witnesses but other appropriate inferences that 
may be drawn from living testimony which elude print. The conclusiveness of a 
“finding of fact” depends on the nature of the materials on which the finding is 
based. The finding even of a so-called “subsidiary fact” may be a more or less 
difficult process varying according to the simplicity or subtlety of the type of 
“fact” in controversy. Finding so-called ultimate “facts” more clearly implies the 
application of standards of law. . . . Thus, the conclusion that may appropriately 
be drawn from the whole mass of evidence is not always the ascertainment of 
the kind of “fact” that precludes consideration by this Court. Particularly is this 
so where a decision here for review cannot escape broadly social judgments . . . . 
Deference properly due to the findings of a lower court does not preclude the re-
view here of such judgments. This recognized scope of appellate review is usu-
ally differentiated from review of ordinary questions of fact by being called re-
view of a question of law, but that is often not an illuminating test and is never 
self-executing.120 
The reasonableness of an officer’s use of force under the Fourth Amend-
ment is one of those mixed questions of fact and law that occupies a position of 
epistemological indeterminacy. When a trial judge is confronted with a record 
in which there is room for disagreement about how best to interpret contested 
evidence, there will often be no clear distinction between the inferences one 
can draw concerning what actions were taken or what events occurred, on the 
one hand, and the assessment of whether those actions or events were reasona-
ble under the circumstances, on the other. In a car chase like that involved in 
Scott or Plumhoff, for example, the Court tells us that the “relevant set of [sub-
sidiary] facts”—the riskiness of the driver’s actions, the degree of danger that 
the driver presented to the officers or the general public, and the alternatives to 
deadly force that were available to the officers—are all questions of fact, 
whereas “the reasonableness of [the officer’s] actions” in light of these factors 
“is a pure question of law.”121 But the Court admits in the same opinion that 
such determinations of reasonableness require “slosh[ing] . . . through [a] fact-
bound morass.”122 
                                                        
120  Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670–71 (1944) (citation omitted). 
121  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). 
122  Id. at 383. 
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Consider the difference between the Court’s treatment of the Eighth 
Amendment PLRA question in Brown v. Plata and the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness question in Scott v. Harris—with the Court finding that the “mixed 
question of law and fact” in a dispute over prison conditions in Plata “weighs 
heavily on the fact side”123 and requires deferential review, but insisting that 
the “relevant set of facts” in a police chase in Scott were entirely distinct from 
the “pure question of law”124 presented in the summary judgment motion. This 
difference in treatment is a matter of policy, not epistemology. The Court made 
a policy judgment in Scott that summary judgment rulings by district courts in 
Fourth Amendment qualified immunity cases should always be subject to non-
deferential appellate review, despite the fact-bound morass that many such rul-
ings entail. That policy decision performs several important doctrinal functions 
in the qualified immunity setting. 
First, attaching the label “pure question of law” to a Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness determination encourages district judges to be more aggressive 
in using summary judgment to prevent claims against government officials 
from going to trial. It is a natural inclination to react to an ambiguous factual 
record as the trial judge did in Romo v. Largen when he explained, “ ‘[O]n the 
facts of this case there’s enough uniqueness, enough in the mix to say that the 
question of whether a reasonable officer could have mistakenly concluded there 
was probable cause should go to the jury,’ ”125 without distinguishing carefully 
between how best to interpret the factual record and how best to assess the rea-
sonableness of the officer’s actions under different possible interpretations of 
that record. Likewise, in Scott v. Harris, the lower federal courts and Justice 
Stevens in dissent both believed that the degree of danger in Victor Harris’s 
driving and the justification for using deadly force in light of that danger con-
stituted “a question of fact best reserved for a jury.”126 It was in response to that 
belief that the majority insisted upon the “pure question of law” formulation.127 
Scott insisted upon the “legal” character of Fourth Amendment questions to 
push lower federal courts toward more robust enforcement of the qualified im-
munity defense. This aspect of the opinion is not a matter of the essence of the 
question presented, nor is it a pure interpretation of the summary judgment 
standard. It is a policy decision driven by the interests underlying the qualified 
                                                        
123  Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1932 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124  Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8.  
125  Brief on Appeal of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 105, at 7 (quoting District Court 
Transcript). 
126  Scott, 550 U.S. at 395 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Harris v. Coweta Cnty., 433 F.3d 807, 
815 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (“We reject the 
defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be considered sufficiently 
reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a substantial threat of immi-
nent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a 
jury.”). 
127  Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8. 
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immunity defense—an application of a procedural doctrine in light of substan-
tive policy priorities.128 
Second, the “pure question of law” designation makes it possible for the 
Court to exercise interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in a wider array of quali-
fied immunity cases, despite the many problems with this application of the 
collateral order doctrine described in Part II above. That consequence is on dis-
play in Plumhoff v. Rickard, where the Court attempts to force its appellate ju-
risdiction precedents into artificially neat categories, insisting that its holding in 
Johnson involved a “question of fact” only because of a disagreement about 
which of several police officers were responsible for an alleged beating, where-
as the interpretation of a video recording and other evidence concerning an 
acknowledged shooting as in Plumhoff raises “legal issues” that are “quite dif-
ferent from any purely factual issues that the trial court might confront if the 
case were tried.”129 It is impossible to square this assertion with the Court’s 
admission in Scott that Fourth Amendment disputes require appellate courts to  
“slosh . . . through [a] factbound morass”130—precisely the type of “legal issue” 
that had previously been deemed categorically inappropriate for collateral order 
review because they are not “separable” from the questions that will remain for 
trial if the court of appeals reverses.131 Confronted with the nonsensicality of its 
appellate jurisdiction ruling in Scott, the Court doubles down in Plumhoff by 
attaching the equally nonsensical label “pure question of law” to the “factbound 
morass” of Fourth Amendment disputes. 
Both of these fault lines are specific to the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
The collateral order rule that sometimes permits an immediate appeal when a 
defense of qualified immunity is rejected depends entirely upon the policies 
underlying the defense, and the pressure to adopt a single version of events to 
measure against clearly established law is a product of the defense’s specific 
doctrinal requirements. In a civil justice system that values transsubstantive 
procedural rules, however, doctrinal adjustments that begin in one setting have 
a tendency to migrate.132 Two members of the Court apparently believed that 
they were issuing a holding specific to antitrust law when they joined the ma-
jority ruling that upended pleading standards in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, but it 
took just two years for the Court to apply its new plausibility standard to a 
claim of unconstitutional discrimination in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.133 Scott was de-
cided in the same year as Twombly. Just two years later, in the Term that gave 
                                                        
128  See generally Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (setting forth a general approach to the interpretation of pro-
cedural doctrines in light of the substantive policies underlying a dispute). 
129  Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2014). 
130  Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. 
131  Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1995). 
132  See Wolff, supra note 128, at 1033–47 (discussing this dynamic in relation to Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)). 
133  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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us Iqbal, the Court reiterated Scott’s reformulation of the summary judgment 
standard—that a non-moving party is entitled to have the record viewed in the 
most favorable light only after convincing the court that there is a “genuine” 
dispute of material fact—in a case involving claims of illegal discrimination in 
the workplace.134 Scott did not work an immediate revolution, as Twombly did, 
but the parallels are ominous. 
CONCLUSION 
Lower federal courts are already struggling to interpret the holding of Scott 
v. Harris while faithfully applying the presumption in favor of the non-moving 
party and hewing to the strict limitations on interlocutory jurisdiction that the 
Court has long demanded. Without further clarification from the Court, it is not 
yet clear whether they will succeed in that effort. And without careful attention 
to the substantive law context in which the Court set these changes in motion, 
Scott’s destabilizing effects may spread. The full impact of Scott v. Harris on 
the future of summary judgment has yet to be felt. 
  
                                                        
134  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). 
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